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Open access under CCSense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to inﬂuence
events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of
sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cog-
nition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable
implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called ‘Perruchet paradigm’
offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning
systems. We adopted this approach to evaluate the implicit–explicit distinction in the con-
text of a simple task in which outcomes were probabilistically caused by actions. In line
with our initial predictions, we found evidence of a dissociation. We discuss the implica-
tions of this result for theories of sense of agency.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to inﬂuence events in the outside world.
Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) have recently proposed a two-step account that distinguishes between implicit and
explicit aspects of sense of agency. At the implicit level, a basic low-level feeling of being an agent is formed. Synofzik and
colleagues refer to this as the ‘Feeling of Agency’. This level is non-conceptual, and does not involve explicit agency attribu-
tions. Rather, experiences of action are simply tagged as self-caused or not. Although this feeling of agency may be ‘con-
scious’, it is a pre-reﬂective state (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., 2008). That is, the feeling of agency does not involve a
reﬂective act of consciousness and is therefore not, in this sense, explicit. It is suggested that this aspect of sense of agency
is informed by sensorimotor processes, such as efferent motor information and sensory feedback. At the explicit level, a high-
er-order conceptual judgement of being an agent is formed. Synofzik and colleagues refer to this as the ‘Judgement of
Agency’. At this level, explicit attributions of agency to oneself or another are made. It is suggested that this aspect of sense
of agency is closely linked to higher-level sources of information like beliefs, as well as social and contextual cues.
The existence of, and relationship between, these aspects of sense of agency is still a matter for debate and has been the
topic of an increasing amount of research on sense of agency (David, Stenzel, Schneider, & Engel, 2011; Miele, Wager,
Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011; Obhi & Hall, 2011). Analogous distinctions between implicit and explicit representations exist
in other areas of cognition, notably learning. Implicit learning is evident in a clear inﬂuence of experience on responses in
the absence of explicit knowledge or awareness (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998). For example, in Reber’s early arti-
ﬁcial grammar learning study (Reber, 1967), participants were asked to memorise letter strings generated by a ﬁnite-statelogy, Goldsmiths, University of London, London SE14 6NW, UK.
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they would now have to classify new letter strings as grammatical or not. Reber found that whilst participants were able to
correctly classify these new strings at a level signiﬁcantly above chance, they were unable to correctly describe the grammat-
ical rules that generated them. Despite evidence such as this, the distinction between implicit and explicit learning systems
remains controversial, with some authors suggesting that the evidence for implicit learning is weak at best (Shanks, 2010).
A paradigm developed by Perruchet and colleagues offers a rigorous way of experimentally scrutinising this possible dis-
sociation between implicit and explicit learning systems (Perruchet, 1985; Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006).
Brieﬂy, implicit and explicit measures of learning and prediction are pitted against each other in the context of a probabilistic
learning task. In this task there is a probabilistic relationship between two events (E1 and E2). After a run of trials in which E1
is followed by E2, explicit measures of learning show a decrease in the strength of E2 prediction, consistent with the gam-
bler’s fallacy. That is, people increasingly expect an event that has not occurred for some time (in this case, E1 in the absence
of E2). On the other hand, implicit measures (such as reaction times, Perruchet et al. (2006); or eye-blink conditioning,
Perruchet (1985)) show the reverse effect of repeated E1–E2 pairing, namely an increase in the strength of E2 prediction,
consistent with the recency effect. Thus, on the critical trials following repeated E1–E2 pairings, explicit judgement suggests
that E2 is not predicted, while implicit learning suggests that it is. This dissociation between implicit and explicit measures
of prediction (depicted in Fig. 1) provides strong evidence for the existence of separable learning systems.
Previous experimental and theoretical work has highlighted the importance of learning and prediction for sense of agency
(Blakemore,Wolpert, & Frith, 2002;Moore&Haggard, 2008).Moreover, at the implicit level, this learning is thought to operate
according to basic associative learning principles (Moore, Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2011). Given this, and the putative distinction
between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency described above, the present study took its inspiration from Perru-
chet’s dissociation approach. Our implicit measure was based upon the intentional binding paradigm. Intentional binding re-
fers to the compression in the perceived duration of an interval between a movement and its consequence when that
movement is under one’s own voluntary control (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002;Moore & Obhi, 2012). In the standard ver-
sion of this paradigm, participants judge the onset of either voluntary actions (a key press) or the onset of a sensory event (a
tone) presented 250 ms after the action. The perceived onset of the action is shifted later in time relative to the perceived onset
of actions in a baseline condition in which the action does not produce a tone. Furthermore, the perceived onset of the tone is
shifted earlier in time relative to the perceived onset of tones in a baseline condition in which the tone is presented without
action. This binding effect is speciﬁc to voluntary action. When an action is passively induced, participants do not show any
binding (in fact, there is a reversal of this effect). On this basis it was suggested that intentional binding is an implicitmarker
of sense of agency. There is now considerable evidence supporting this view (Moore & Haggard, 2010; Moore & Obhi, 2012).
In the present experiment there was a probabilistic relationship between a key press and a tone outcome. Following the
standard Perruchet paradigm (e.g. Perruchet et al., 2006), the tone outcome occurred on 50% of trials at random. Because the
tone did not always occur we only measured the perceived time of action. We contrasted this implicit intentional binding
measure of sense of agency with an explicit one in which participants made a subjective prediction of the likelihood that
their action would cause an outcome on the next trial. Many previous agency studies (e.g. Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz,
& Haggard, 2012) have favoured retrospective agency judgements (such as asking participant to rate the extent to which
they felt their action caused the previous event). However, we felt this was inappropriate given the absence of another pos-
sible cause of the tone. We compared these implicit and explicit indices of sense of agency as a function of the nature and
length of preceding action-outcome trials. Based on the logic of the ‘Perruchet paradigm’, if there are separate independent
agency processing systems we would expect a dissociation between these implicit and explicit agency measures. That is,
explicit prediction that a tone will follow an action should be high after a run of ‘action only’ trials and low after a run ofFig. 1. Schematic depicting the dissociation between implicit and explicit measures of learning and prediction (following Perruchet et al. (2006)). Implicit
measures show a decrease in prediction strength following longer runs of E1 alone trials and an increase in prediction strength following longer runs of E1–
E2 pair trials. On the other hand, explicit measures show an increase in prediction strength following longer runs of E1 alone trials and a decrease in
prediction strength following longer runs of E1–E2 pair trials.
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‘action + tone’ trials and weak after a run of ‘action only’ trials (following the principles of associative learning). In this way,
we predicted a signiﬁcant negative linear trend for explicit prediction and a signiﬁcant positive linear trend for intentional
binding. Furthermore, Perruchet et al. (2006) additionally observed a signiﬁcant cubic trend for the explicit prediction mea-
sure. This was due to the presence of a ‘positive recency effect’, whereby explicit prediction after a single E1 event is lower
than after a single E1–E2 pairing (see also, Hyman, 1953). In line with this we also predicted a signiﬁcant cubic trend for our
explicit prediction measure only.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-three participants were initially recruited to the study. Three were subsequently excluded; one on the basis of
failure to follow task instructions, one on the basis of uncorrected visual impairment (self-reported by participant) and
one due to experimenter error. Of the ﬁnal sample of 20 participants, all were right-handed, 12 were female and the average
age was 27.5 years (range: 21–36 years).
2.2. Procedure
On each trial in the operant condition participants pressed a key whenever they felt the urge to do so. They were instructed
to press as spontaneously as possible and to refrain from pre-planning their movements. On 50% of trials selected at random,Fig. 2. Trial structure in the operant condition. At the start of each trial the clock-hand rotated around the clock-face (and would do so until the end of the
trial). Whenever they felt the ‘urge’ participants would press a key with their right index ﬁnger. On 50% of trials this would cause a tone. The order of tone
presentation was randomised. At the end of the trial the participant would report the time of their key press (implicit prediction) and also estimate the
likelihood of the tone on the next trial (explicit prediction).
Table 1
Classiﬁcation scheme for the previous three trials (n-1, n-2 and n-3) based on Perruchet et al. (2006).
n-3 Trial n-2 Trial n-1 Trial Trial ‘n’ classiﬁcation
(based on Perruchet et al. (2006))
‘Action only’ trials
‘Action only’ ‘Action only’ ‘Action only’ 3
‘Action + tone’ ‘Action only’ ‘Action only’ 2
‘Action + tone’ ‘Action + tone’ ‘Action only’ 1
‘Action only’ ‘Action + tone’ ‘Action only’ 1
‘Action + tone’ trials
‘Action only’ ‘Action only’ ‘Action + tone’ 1
‘Action + tone’ ‘Action only’ ‘Action + tone’ 1
‘Action only’ ‘Action + tone’ ‘Action + tone’ 2
‘Action + tone’ ‘Action + tone’ ‘Action + tone’ 3
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around a clock face presented on a computer screen in front of them. The clock hand completed one revolution every 2.56 s.
The clock hand continued to rotate for a random period of time after the key press. On each trial, participants had to judge
the onset of their key press by reporting the position of the clock hand when they depressed the key. Next, participants were
prompted to ‘Rate the extent to which you believe there will be a tone on the NEXT trial’. They indicated this by reporting a
number between 0 (‘Deﬁnitely no tone’) and 100 (‘Deﬁnitely a tone’). The schematic in Fig. 2 depicts the trial structure. There
were 300 trials in total, split into 6 blocks of 50 trials (allowing regular periods of rest). Because the tone did not always occur
we focussed only on the perceived time of the action.
Each participant also performed a baseline condition for the intentional binding task. Participants pressed a key whenever
they felt the urge to do so, but this key press never caused a tone. In this condition, participants reported the time they
pressed the key (because there were no tones, no explicit predictions were collected). There was a single block of 50 trials.
Half the participants completed the baseline condition at the start of the experiment and half at the end.
2.3. Data analysis
Following Perruchet et al. (2006), each trial was classiﬁed according to the nature and length of the preceding trial runs.
Speciﬁcally, trials were classiﬁed according to whether the preceding trial consisted of a run of 1, 2 or 3 ‘Action only’ trials or
a run or 1, 2 or 3 ‘Action + tone’ trials (see Table 1 for details).
For the intentional binding measure we analysed shifts in the perceived time of action. This shift was calculated as the
judgement error in the operant condition minus judgement error in the baseline condition. These shifts were analysed as a
function of the nature and length of the trials that preceded it. For the explicit prediction measure we analysed explicit pre-
dictions as a function of the same information. It is important to point out what determines the starting point of previous
learning history for the two different measures (i.e. trial n-1) relative to each individual trial in the experiment. For explicit
prediction, the start point is the current trial. This is because on each trial the learning event (‘Action only’ or ‘Action + tone’)
occurs prior to the prediction being made. For intentional binding, previous learning history starts from the previous trial.
This is because on the current trial the learning event (‘Action only’ or ‘Action + tone’) happens after the participant’s action.
3. Results
Fig. 3A and B show the results for intentional binding and explicit prediction respectively. As can be seen, the nature and
length of preceding trial runs had different effects on intentional binding and explicit prediction. This was supported by sta-
tistical analyses. Separate trend analyses were performed for intentional binding and explicit prediction measures, with ‘pre-
ceding trial run’ as a within-subjects factor (‘Action only’ trials: 3, 2, 1; ‘Action + tone’ trials: 1, 2, 3).
For intentional binding there was a signiﬁcant main effect of ‘preceding trial run’, F(5,95), 2.37, p = .045, m2partial ¼ :11.
More importantly, and as predicted, for intentional binding there was a signiﬁcant positive linear trend, F(1,19) = 5.96,
p = .03, m2partial ¼ :24, indicating a stronger action-outcome association following longer runs of operant trials. Also as pre-
dicted, there was no signiﬁcant cubic trend for the intentional binding measure, F(1,19) = .22, p = .65, indicating the lack
of a positive recency effect.
For explicit prediction the pattern of results was more complicated. Overall, there was no signiﬁcant main effect of ‘pre-
ceding trial run’, F(5,95) = 1.56, p = .18. More important were the trend analyses. The strength of prediction decreased with
longer runs of ‘action + tone’ trials and increased with longer runs of ‘action only’ trials. This is largely consistent with the
gambler’s fallacy. However, contrary to our initial prediction there was no consistent linear decrease for explicit prediction,
F(1,19) = .23, p = .64. We also predicted a signiﬁcant cubic trend for explicit prediction (following Perruchet et al. (2006)),
indicating a positive recency effect. This was conﬁrmed by our trend analyses, F(1,19) = 19.96, p < .001, m2partial ¼ :51.
Fig. 3. (A) Action binding plotted as a function of learning history. (B) Explicit predictions (1 = ‘deﬁnitely no tone’/100 = ‘deﬁnitely a tone’) plotted as a
function of learning history. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Action binding refers to the difference in judgement error in the operant vs.
baseline conditions. The more positive the difference, the larger the action binding effect.
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In this experiment we investigated implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency, and the relation between them. Pre-
vious theoretical work has proposed separable implicit and explicit agency processing systems (Synofzik et al., 2008). To test
this, we used a method previously developed by Perruchet, which provides one of the more convincing demonstrations of
separable implicit and explicit learning systems. Speciﬁcally, we explored how intentional binding and explicit prediction
of action outcomes varied as a function of the nature and length of previous trial runs. We found a pattern of results that
is largely consistent with the Perruchet effect. Based on the logic of this paradigm, our results provide evidence in favour
of separable implicit and explicit agency processing systems.
The pattern of results for intentional binding implies an automatic strengthening of association with more repeated oper-
ant experience. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that intentional binding is linked to lower level implicit aspects of
sense of agency, mediated by automatic associative learning mechanisms (Moore, Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2011; Synofzik,
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Our ﬁndings also shed light on the nature of the relationship between implicit and explicit aspects
of sense of agency. The different pattern of results for implicit and explicit measures suggests that these systems are, at least
to some extent, independent. At ﬁrst glance, this appears to cast doubt on the validity of using intentional binding to probe
higher-order aspects of sense of agency, as has been previously suggested (Moore & Haggard, 2010). However, the speciﬁc
pattern of results might suggest that these two aspects of sense of agency are not fully independent. The cubic trend in our
explicit prediction data indicates a ‘positive recency’ effect. This effect has also been observed for explicit measures in pre-
vious studies using the Perruchet paradigm (e.g. Perruchet et al., 2006), and is expected given an automatic strengthening of
association following the pairing of two-events. Such a pattern of results might suggest that the implicit agency processing
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term the two measures may be partly interdependent. This interdependency may reﬂect the fact that we took the two mea-
sures concurrently, thus increasing the likelihood that one system affects the other (Perruchet et al., 2006). In light of this we
would suggest that, whilst implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency are indeed separable, they are unlikely to be fully
independent. This ﬁts the theoretical framework outlined by Synofzik et al. (2008) which emphasises the interaction be-
tween these aspects of sense of agency via top-down and bottom-up mechanisms.
In summary, adopting an established dissociation paradigm we explored the putative existence of, and relationship be-
tween implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency. Based on the logic of this paradigm, our results suggest that there are
separable, and to some extent independent, agency processing systems. We would suggest that paradigms developed in the
context of the implicit and explicit learning debate will be useful for further clarifying the nature of agency processing.
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